The Lost Balance: How Modern Youth Are Confusing Culture, Religion, and Language

🌍 Roots, Identity, and the Modern World:

Why We Must Reclaim the Balance Between Culture, Religion, and Language

A deep reflection on belonging in a world overflowing with information.

We are living in the most connected era in human history.
With a single tap, we can watch people thousands of miles away — how they speak, dress, pray, celebrate, debate, fight, and live.
We can follow influencers, spiritual guides, trend-setters, and strangers with charisma.

But this abundance of digital exposure has created something subtle yet powerful:
a growing confusion about identity.

Many young people today struggle with a simple question:

“Who am I — culturally, religiously, regionally?”

The answer should be straightforward.
But in reality, the lines have been blurred by trends, reels, social pressures, group expectations, and sometimes even insecurity.

This article unpacks that confusion and reflects on why preserving our roots — while embracing the world — is essential for a healthy and confident identity.

🌿 1. Culture, Religion, Region — Three Pillars Often Confused

To understand the identity struggle, we must first understand the difference between these three pillars:

🌱 Culture is inherited.

It is the food your grandmother cooked,
the lullabies you heard as a child,
the festivals your village celebrated,
and the stories your elders told.

It is not chosen — it grows on you naturally.

🕌 Religion is believed.

It is the faith you hold,
the moral compass you follow,
and the spiritual connection you seek.

Religion is deeply personal and inward.

🌏 Region is lived.

It is your surrounding environment,
the language of your streets,
the scent of your soil,
the sound of your neighbourhood.

Region shapes everyday life.

These three were meant to coexist peacefully.
But the modern world often mixes them, creating a sense of confusion or conflict that never existed originally.

🗣️ 2. When Language Turns into a Badge Instead of a Bond

One of the most visible examples of identity confusion is the shift in languages.

Young people across the world — not just in one community — feel shy, awkward, or inferior speaking their mother tongue.

Why?

Because the digital world assigns “status levels” to languages.

English is seen as modern
Urdu is seen as poetic or religious
Arabic is seen as sacred
Hindi is seen as popular
Regional languages are seen as “local” or “less cool”

This is not only inaccurate — it is tragic.

Language is not just communication; it is emotion.
It is the sound in which your parents scolded and loved you.
It is the tongue in which your childhood memories live.
It is the emotional fingerprint of your identity.

When young people avoid their mother tongue out of embarrassment, the loss is not linguistic — it is emotional.

A person who loses their language loses a part of their heritage.

🕌 3. When Religion is Mistaken for Identity Inside Identity

Many young people, influenced by global digital content, begin to associate religion with external markers:

a language
a dress style
certain expressions
certain cultural habits
certain content creators

This leads them to believe:

“To appear more connected to my religion, I should behave or speak a certain way.”

But religion was never meant to define:

what regional language you speak,
what cultural food you eat,
or what local traditions you follow.

Your mother tongue does not determine your holiness.
Your regional culture does not dilute your faith.

Religion guides the heart.
Culture shapes behaviour.
Region shapes lifestyle.
They do not compete — they complement.

🌱 4. The Psychological Side: Identity Insecurity and Trend Imitation

Humans naturally seek:

belonging
acceptance
recognition

Young people, especially, want to feel part of a larger group.

When social media defines “identity standards,” many begin imitating them — often unconsciously.

They do not realize that they are:

abandoning their mother tongue,
rejecting their cultural roots,
distancing from their region,
and chasing someone else’s identity template.

This quest for “special identity” ironically makes them lose their true identity.

🏛️ 5. “Be a Roman in Rome” — A Misunderstood Wisdom

There is a common saying:

“When in Rome, be a Roman.”

But what it really means is:

Adapt to your surroundings with respect —
without forgetting who you are.

The modern world applies only the first part (adapt)
and ignores the second (stay rooted).

Adapting is beautiful.
Imitating blindly is not.

A strong identity is formed when you can:

adopt the world’s best
and still stand firm in your own roots.

🌟 6. A Message to the Younger Generation: Know Your Layers

Before adopting any trend or identity expression, ask:

1️⃣ Am I following this because of faith or because it’s trending?

2️⃣ Is this cultural or did I pick it up from social media?

3️⃣ Is this language part of my surroundings or peer pressure?

4️⃣ Am I abandoning my own regional identity out of hesitation?

Awareness is the first step toward authenticity.

🌍 7. The Universal Conclusion

You do not become refined by rejecting your roots.
You do not become religious by abandoning your culture.
You do not become modern by discarding your mother tongue.
You do not become special by imitating trends.

You become strong when you know:

what is yours,
what you believe,
what you inherited,
and what you choose consciously.

A truly confident person can stand among many identities
without feeling the need to erase their own.

💬 Final Thought

Let your faith guide your inner world.
Let your culture beautify your behaviour.
Let your language remind you of home.
Let your region shape your reality.
Let your global exposure widen your perspective.

In the end, identity is not about choosing one and abandoning the others.
It is about balancing them with wisdom.

When you know who you are,
you don’t need to chase another identity —
you carry your own with quiet pride.

The Art of Killing Without Weapons

There is a line in Telugu that has been haunting me lately. It strikes a chord so deep that it feels less like a sentence and more like a scar being reopened:

“Oka manishini maanasikanga entha champagalamo, antha champesi. Bayataki Prema chupisthe emi upayogam.”

It asks a simple, terrifying question: "After mentally killing a person as much as possible, what is the use of showing love outwardly?"

We are taught that violence is physical. We look for bruises, for broken bones, for the loud evidence of harm. But I have come to realize that the most fatal wounds are the ones that never bleed.

I am talking about the "mental killing."

It doesn’t happen overnight. It is a slow poison. It is the consistent invalidation of feelings. It is the silence when you need to be heard. It is the subtle art of making someone feel small, worthless, and crazy for demanding basic respect. When you do this to a person—when you drain their spirit until they are just a shell walking through life—you have effectively committed murder. You have killed the version of them that knew how to smile without hesitating.

And this is where the tragedy turns into a farce.

After the spirit is broken, the "love" begins. The public displays. The polite gestures in front of family. The smiles for the camera.

To the world, it looks like affection. But to the person who has been destroyed on the inside, it feels like a mockery.

I look at this dynamic and I wonder: What is the point?

Who is this performance for? It certainly isn’t for the victim. You cannot heal a soul you deliberately broke just by pretending everything is fine on the outside. It is like planting a rose garden over a grave and expecting the dead to smell the flowers.

Real love isn’t about how well you can act when the curtains are up. Real love is about nurturing the mind and spirit of the person you claim to care for when no one is watching.

If you have killed them mentally, your outward love is not a gift. It is just a ghost.

Acknowledgement: -Kesari Babu & -AI

Disclaimer:

This post reflects on deep emotional pain and the dynamics of toxic behavior. It is a personal expression and not professional psychological advice.

Comprehensive Report: The Telangana Raw Rice Miller Crisis (2021-2025)

Authors and Contributions:

This report was prepared by Kesari Babu with assistance from an intelligent AI assistant. Kesari Babu led data collection, analysis, and the development of recommendations based on comprehensive review of three primary rice miller reports, government documents, news sources, and scientific literature.The AI assistant provided research support, synthesis of external information, data aggregation, and drafting of the report narrative.This collaboration combines expert domain knowledge with advanced AI research capabilities to produce an evidence-based analysis of Telangana's raw rice milling crisis.

An Evidence-Based Analysis of Systemic Failure in India's Paddy Procurement System

Executive Summary

The crisis afflicting raw rice millers in Telangana represents one of the most severe operational and financial catastrophes in India's agricultural supply chain. This comprehensive analysis, drawing from miller-provided data, government documents, news reports, and agricultural research, conclusively demonstrates that the state's Custom Milled Rice (CMR) system has fundamentally collapsed, transforming legitimate rice processors into involuntary storage warehouses while systematically bankrupting them through an impossible quality compliance regime.

The evidence is unequivocal: millers are being forced to store government-allotted paddy for 12-17+ months—far exceeding any reasonable operational timeline—and are then being penalized when the inevitable quality degradation (specifically, broken rice percentages exceeding the 25% Fair Average Quality limit) occurs. This is not a case of miller negligence or misconduct; it is the predictable outcome of a procurement system that has exceeded its storage and distribution capacity while continuing to operate at full speed.^[1]^[2]^[3]

Since 2014-15, approximately 1,868 mills have defaulted on CMR deliveries worth Rs 35,000 crore, with only 6% (Rs 2,017 crore) recovered. The state's rice export industry has declined by 20-30% in 2025, with large mills reporting a 55-60% drop in operations. As of October 2025, FCI godowns in Telangana operate at 96% capacity (21.72 of 22.61 lakh metric tonnes occupied), leaving only 0.89 LMT available—yet the state continues procuring 80 LMT for Kharif 2025-26.^[4]^[5]^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]^[10]

Part I: The Structural Crisis

The Incompatible Dual Mandate

Raw rice millers in Telangana operate under two competing government mandates that have become physically incompatible under the current system:^[11]^[3]^[1]

Mandate 1: The 67% Yield Requirement - Millers must deliver 67 kilograms of Custom Milled Rice for every 100 kilograms of paddy received.^[12]^[13]^[14]

Mandate 2: The 25% Broken Rice Limit - All delivered rice must meet FCI's Fair Average Quality (FAQ) specifications, which mandate a maximum of 25% broken rice.^[15]^[16]^[17]

Under normal circumstances—where paddy is milled within 3-6 months of procurement and stored in controlled conditions—these mandates are achievable. However, the current system in Telangana has deviated so dramatically from normal operational parameters that compliance has become impossible.^[18]^[19]

The critical failure point is the 25% broken rice threshold. Agricultural research conclusively demonstrates that paddy is extraordinarily sensitive to storage duration and environmental conditions. Grain fissuring—the microscopic cracking of rice kernels—begins almost immediately when paddy is stored beyond optimal conditions (14% moisture content, controlled temperature below 25°C). Telangana's harsh climate, characterized by extreme temperature fluctuations (15-40°C seasonal variation) and humidity swings during monsoon periods, accelerates this deterioration.^[20]^[21]^[22]^[23]^[24]^[25]^[26]^[1]

Research shows that rice stored at ambient temperatures (28°C+) experiences rapid quality degradation after just 8 weeks, with broken rice percentages increasing proportionally with storage time. Multiple studies confirm that storage beyond 6 months at uncontrolled temperatures results in head rice recovery declining significantly, while broken rice percentages increase to 30-40% or higher. When paddy is stored for 12-17 months—as the data from Telangana demonstrates is now routine—the 25% broken rice limit becomes physically unattainable.^[22]^[27]^[26]^[28]^[29]^[2]^[3]

The "Rolling Backlog": Quantified Evidence of System Collapse

The most damning evidence of systemic failure comes from the anonymized delivery data spanning three consecutive Kharif seasons (2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24).^[2]^[3]

Allotment Season	Total Deliveries	Minimum Storage (Days)	Median Storage (Days)	Maximum Storage (Days)	QC Rejections
Kharif 2021-22	47	119 (4 months)	430 (14 months)	511 (17 months)	1
Kharif 2022-23	27	233 (8 months)	419 (14 months)	484 (16 months)	2
Kharif 2023-24	27	148 (5 months)	313 (10 months)	391 (13 months)	3

These figures represent storage periods of 10-17 months—more than double any reasonable milling timeline. The data proves this is not an isolated incident affecting a few mills, but a consistent, systemic pattern affecting the entire procurement system.^[3]^[2]

Crucially, the data shows a Kharif 2021-22 consignment rejected by Quality Control in March 2023—precisely 15 months after allotment. This is direct, irrefutable evidence linking extreme storage duration to quality failure. For raw rice, rejection at the QC stage almost certainly indicates broken rice percentages exceeding the 25% FCI limit.^[1]^[2]^[3]

The pattern is clear: paddy allotted in late 2021/early 2022 remained in mills until March 2023 (15 months). Paddy from late 2022/early 2023 was still being dispatched in February 2024 (12 months later). This is not a seasonal cycle; it is a chronic accumulation where each new harvest arrives while the previous season's paddy remains unprocessed and deteriorating.^[2]^[3]

Escalating Weight Losses: The Compounding Cost

Beyond quality rejections, the data reveals a second, equally destructive loss mechanism: physical weight loss during extended storage.^[3]^[2]

Season	Deliveries	Average Shortage per Delivery (kg)	Total Shortage (kg)	Trend
K21-22	47	0.21	10.10	Baseline
K22-23	27	0.21	5.56	Stable
K23-24	27	0.61	16.44	3× increase

The "shortage" represents direct weight loss—driage (moisture loss), pest damage, spillage, and grain loss during handling. The average shortage per delivery in Kharif 2023-24 is nearly three times higher than in the previous two seasons (0.61 kg vs. 0.21 kg), indicating that the compounding effect of extended storage is worsening over time.^[2]^[3]

This represents a direct, non-reimbursed loss absorbed entirely by the miller. With no compensation mechanism for storage losses beyond 3-6 months, millers are bearing the full financial cost of the system's dysfunction.^[1]^[3]^[2]

Part II: Historical Timeline and Government Policy Evolution

The Crisis Timeline (2021-2025)

2021-22 Kharif Season: The Beginning

The BRS government procured 50.9 lakh metric tonnes (LMT) of paddy, which were rapidly allotted to mills across the state. Prescribed CMR delivery deadlines were set for mid-2022. However, FCI godowns were already approaching capacity. By early 2023, the national government refused to extend deadlines for 2021-22 Kharif stock, leaving the state and its millers with over 2 lakh tonnes of undelivered rice. This marked the beginning of the glut.^[6]^[30]^[1]

2022-23 Kharif Season: The Breaking Point

New paddy from the late 2022/early 2023 harvest was allotted to mills already holding 12+ months of 2021-22 stock. The prescribed delivery deadlines (June/July 2023) came and went with no FCI offtake capacity available. A "prolonged deadlock" between state and national government entities meant FCI was refusing new deliveries. Deadlines were repeatedly extended—first to May 2024, then to September 2024.^[31]^[32]^[3]^[1]^[2]

This period became known as the "Rotting in Mills" phase, where rice sat for 12-18+ months. The broken rice crisis exploded during this period, as the entire CMR delivery system appeared to have stalled. By February 2024, the civil supplies corporation announced it had not yet recovered the full 43.73 LMT of rice due from the Kharif 2022-23 season—15 months after the initial deadline.^[32]^[33]^[1]

Civil Supplies Minister N. Uttam Kumar Reddy warned that the corporation faced Rs 56,000 crore in debt and Rs 11,000 crore in losses, with an interest burden of Rs 3,000 crore annually. He noted that delays in CMR delivery could have "serious consequences" for future FCI allocations to Telangana.^[34]^[33]^[32]

2023-24 Rabi Season: Total System Saturation

A record bumper Rabi crop of 72.4 LMT was procured and allotted to mills still holding unprocessed 2022-23 stock. By October 2025, FCI godowns in Telangana were reported at 96% capacity—21.72 LMT occupied of 22.61 LMT total capacity, leaving only 0.89 LMT available.^[7]^[8]^[6]^[1]

Despite this storage crisis, the government set a Kharif 2025-26 procurement target of 80 LMT from an expected production of 148 LMT. The state requested the Centre to increase the FCI procurement target from 54 LMT to 80 LMT and provide 300 special railway rakes per month to evacuate existing stocks.^[35]^[6]^[7]

2024-25: Policy Tightening Under Congress Government

Following the Congress party's election victory in December 2023, the new government under Chief Minister A. Revanth Reddy introduced stringent reforms to address the accumulated defaults.^[36]^[37]^[38]^[39]^[9]

In October 2024, the government issued GO MS No. 27, implementing mandatory bank guarantees for millers based on their default history:^[37]^[38]^[40]^[36]

· No previous defaults: 10% bank guarantee or 25% security deposit

· Defaulted but paid with penalty: 20% bank guarantee or 25% security deposit

· Defaulted without paying penalty: 25% bank guarantee plus 25% security deposit on approved milling capacity

This policy faced strong opposition from millers, particularly the Raw Rice Millers Association representing 2,850 millers, who argued they were not consulted and that the requirements were financially prohibitive. The government defended the policy by citing that Rs 2,500 crore worth of paddy had been diverted to private markets by defaulting millers in previous years.^[40]^[41]^[36]^[37]^[11]

The government also increased milling charges by Rs 30 per quintal for coarse variety and Rs 40 per quintal for fine variety (from the baseline Rs 100), but made this conditional on meeting FCI-prescribed delivery deadlines. Millers protested this conditionality, arguing that delays are often caused by factors beyond their control—gunny bag shortages, godown unavailability, and FCI acceptance delays.^[42]^[41]^[11]

By November 2024, over one-third of Telangana's 3,500 millers had yet to comply with the bank guarantee requirements, causing procurement disruptions. Only 992 raw rice mills had adhered to the guarantee requirements, compared to 667 parboiled mills.^[43]

In December 2024, the government offered a concession: millers who had cleared 100% of their CMR dues could pay the 25% penalty in two instalments—50% upfront and 50% by December 31, 2024.^[44]

The Scale of Defaults: State-Wide Crisis

The magnitude of CMR defaults is staggering. According to civil supplies department data, 1,868 mills defaulted between Kharif Marketing Season (KMS) 2014-15 and KMS 2023-24, representing over 13% of total CMR worth approximately Rs 35,000 crore. Of this, only about Rs 2,017 crore (6%) has been recovered, with over 7% (approximately Rs 33,000 crore) remaining pending.^[9]

District-level data reveals the geographic concentration of defaults:^[45]^[46]^[47]^[9]

· Mancherial District: 25 millers defaulted on CMR worth Rs 205.47 crore from Vanakalam and Yasangi seasons 2022-2024. Cases registered against 9 millers, with 14 others previously booked.^[45]

· Warangal District: 15 rice mills owe over Rs 80 crore in CMR, with pending allocations for 2023-24 Kharif and 2024 Rabi potentially adding another Rs 10 crore.^[31]

· Karimnagar/Peddapalli: In June 2023, authorities found that 2.34 lakh tons of CMR rice (worth Rs 750 crore) from the last four seasons remained pending with rice millers. Subsequent inspections uncovered that 2.66 lakh quintals of paddy had gone missing from several mills.^[48]

The government response has escalated progressively. The Revenue Recovery (RR) Act was invoked against defaulting millers, allowing attachment of immovable property. The civil supplies department asked collectors and sub-registrars to stop property transactions of errant millers and prevent them from transferring properties to family members or benamis.^[39]

Part III: The Allotment vs. Capacity Crisis

Forced Over-Allotment and Open-Plinth Storage

A critical structural problem emerges from the research: the government systematically allots more paddy than rice mill sheds can shelter.^[49]^[1]

State procurement policy allocates paddy based on a mill's total registered milling capacity, not its available storage space or immediate processing capability. During bumper procurement seasons, paddy is rapidly "dumped" at mill gates regardless of actual storage availability. Millers are legally responsible for this allotted stock from the moment it arrives.^[49]^[1]

When shed capacity is exceeded—which has become routine rather than exceptional—millers are forced to store surplus paddy in open plinths (outdoor stacking areas) covered with tarps. Industry sources and miller representatives confirm this is a widespread practice during peak procurement seasons.^[50]^[43]^[49]^[1]

This open-plinth storage is catastrophic for grain quality:^[25]^[20]^[22]^[1]

1. Temperature Fluctuations: Telangana experiences extreme temperature variations, from lows of 10-15°C in winter to highs exceeding 40°C in summer. Research shows that temperature fluctuations of 20°C or more accelerate grain fissuring exponentially.^[8]^[24]^[51]^[22]

2. Humidity Cycles: Monsoon periods bring 70-90% relative humidity, while dry seasons can drop below 40%. Studies demonstrate that humidity swings above 20 percentage points cause rapid moisture absorption and release, leading to internal stress cracks in paddy kernels.^[23]^[51]

3. Moisture Condensation: Outdoor storage creates intense moisture condensation during temperature gradients, particularly affecting top layers of stacked paddy. This remoisturizes grain, causing fissures and promoting fungal growth.^[21]^[18]^[25]

4. Pest Infestation: Extended outdoor exposure increases pest activity, leading to grain damage and weight loss.^[28]^[21]

Under these conditions, paddy deterioration is not merely probable—it is guaranteed and unavoidable. There is no mitigation strategy available to a miller forced to store paddy outdoors for 12-17 months. Upon eventual milling, the broken rice percentage becomes uncontrollable and will inevitably exceed the 25% FCI limit.^[52]^[53]^[22]^[3]^[1]^[2]

Storage Infrastructure Deficit

The state's storage infrastructure has fundamentally failed to keep pace with procurement expansion:^[54]^[6]^[7]^[8]^[49]

FCI Capacity (Telangana):

· Total: 22.61 LMT (13.329 LMT owned, 9.281 LMT hired)^[55]

· Occupied (Oct 2025): 21.72 LMT (96%)

· Available: 0.89 LMT (4%)

State Warehousing Capacity:

· Civil Supplies Corporation: 29.50 LMT

· State Warehousing Corporation: Recently added 3.26 LMT with 75 new warehouses, pushing total capacity to 74 LMT including private facilities^[8]

· Total state infrastructure: Approximately 52 LMT

Despite procurement targets of 80 LMT for Kharif 2025-26, the available FCI storage is less than 1 LMT. The state has urgently requested the Centre to evacuate 21 LMT from FCI warehouses using 300 railway rakes monthly, but execution remains slow.^[6]^[7]^[8]

Farmer organizations have criticized the lack of planning, urging storage capacity augmentation by at least 20% annually to match 8-10% production growth. Instead, capacity has remained stagnant for years, even as Telangana's paddy production grew from 68.17 lakh metric tonnes in KMS 2014-15 to an estimated 277.67 lakh metric tonnes in KMS 2024-25—a 307% increase.^[56]^[8]

Part IV: The Financial and Operational Impact on Millers

The Miller's Loss Pathway: From Processor to Defaulter

The reports outline the exact financial ruin pathway experienced by a typical raw rice miller:^[3]^[1]^[2]

Stage 1: Allotment
A miller receives an allotment of 1,000 quintals of paddy for a new season. Mill sheds are already at 80-90% capacity from previous allotments still pending delivery.

Stage 2: Forced Over-Storage
Government-prescribed delivery deadlines pass without FCI being ready to accept deliveries. The miller is instructed to "hold" the paddy until further notice. With no alternative and legal responsibility for the stock, 400 quintals must be stored in open plinths covered with tarps.

Stage 3: Deterioration Period
For 12-17 months, the paddy endures multiple summer cycles (40°C+) and monsoon seasons (80-90% humidity). Kernels crack internally (fissure). Pests attack the exposed grain. Moisture cycles cause repeated expansion and contraction. Quality irreversibly collapses.

Stage 4: Delivery Call
After 12-17 months, FCI finally signals readiness to accept deliveries. The miller mills the degraded paddy.

Stage 5: Inevitable Failure
The resulting rice contains 35-40% broken kernels, far exceeding the 25% limit. The delivery is rejected: "Process Status: Rejected By QC."^[2]^[3]

Stage 6: The Loss
The miller is declared a "defaulter" despite meeting the 67% yield requirement. They face:^[32]^[39]^[9]^[1]

· 25% penalty on the defaulted value

· 12% annual interest charges

· Bank guarantee invocation (10-25% of paddy value)

· Property attachment under Revenue Recovery Act

· Blacklisting from future allotments

· Criminal cases under BNS/relevant laws^[45]

The rejected high-broken rice must be sold in the open market at a catastrophic loss—potentially 40-50% below the government procurement price. For a 1,000 quintal allotment, this can represent losses of Rs 8-15 lakh or more, not including penalties and interest.^[10]^[48]^[9]^[45]^[1]

The Out-Turn Crisis: 67 kg Unattainable

A critical issue raised repeatedly by millers is the out-turn ratio crisis—the impossibility of achieving 67 kg of rice per 100 kg of paddy under current conditions.^[41]^[57]^[11]^[50]

The president of the Raw Rice Millers Association stated: "Milling a quintal of paddy is yielding only 58 to 59 kgs of rice as against the expected 67 kgs which we have to deliver."^[41]^[11]

At a September 2024 meeting with civil supplies officials, millers expressed concerns that achieving an out-turn of 67 kg for fine rice was "not feasible, especially with a moisture content of 14 percent." They demanded the government conduct test milling to determine actual out-turn and moisture levels before setting operational guidelines.^[57]^[50]

The 67% out-turn standard was established using Punjab paddy as the baseline, where millers reportedly achieve 70 kg per 100 kg paddy due to different soil conditions, paddy varieties, and climatic factors. Telangana's fine rice varieties (sanna paddy) have different physical characteristics and yield profiles.^[42]^[50]^[57]^[41]

The problem is compounded by new equipment requirements:^[11]^[41]

· Sortex machines (color sorters to remove impurities): Reduce output by 3-4 kg per quintal

· Blending machines (for mixing 1% fortified rice kernels as per FCI mandate): Additional processing loss

· Both machines represent significant capital investment (several lakhs of rupees) with installation deadlines

Millers argue that milling charges should be increased to Rs 150 per quintal to compensate for these additional costs and reduced yields, rather than the Rs 30-40 increase conditionally offered.^[42]^[41]^[11]

The Export Collapse and Domestic Market Crisis

The CMR crisis has triggered a cascading collapse in Telangana's rice export industry and domestic private market:^[5]^[4]^[10]

Export Decline:

· Telangana's rice exports fell 20-30% in 2025^[4]^[5]^[10]

· India's non-basmati rice exports (where Telangana is a major player) dropped 6.9% in 2024 to 17.8 million metric tonnes^[10]^[4]

· Key markets (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Nigeria, West Africa) have scaled down imports due to high prices and geopolitical tensions^[4]^[10]

· Telangana's fine rice is "priced out" of global markets—competitors Thailand and Vietnam offer similar quality at lower rates^[10]^[4]

The state's ambitious target of exporting 50-60 lakh tons annually to emerging markets like Indonesia and Africa now appears "increasingly unattainable."^[5]^[4]^[10]

Domestic Operations Collapse:

· Large rice mills in Telangana report a 55-60% drop in operations^[5]^[4]^[10]

· Factors: procurement issues, rising milling costs, delayed government payments, PDS competition^[4]^[5]^[10]

· In Warangal, wholesale traders reported daily sales dropping from 25-30 quintals to just 2-3 quintals in June-July 2025^[5]^[4]

The Congress government's rollout of fine rice through the Public Distribution System (PDS) at subsidized rates has destroyed private market demand. Traders lament: "The PDS rollout has killed our market. Why would people buy from us when subsidized rice is available?"^[10]^[4]^[5]

The Milling Cost Crisis

Millers face escalating operational costs with stagnant or inadequate compensation:^[41]^[11]^[42]

· Milling charges: Not revised since 2018; increased only Rs 30-40 per quintal in 2024, conditional on meeting deadlines^[42]^[41]

· Electricity charges: Substantial increases in recent years^[58]^[41]

· Labor costs: Rising wages

· Diesel costs: For generators and transport

· Equipment costs: Sortex machines, blending machines, maintenance^[11]^[41]

· Custodian charges: For extended storage periods not reimbursed^[41]^[11]

· Transport costs: For intra-state movement not adequately compensated^[11]^[41]

Other states reportedly pay milling charges ranging from Rs 110 to Rs 200 per quintal, compared to Telangana's Rs 100 base rate (now Rs 130-140 conditionally). Millers in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab have significant cost advantages, enabling them to export competitively while Telangana millers struggle.^[42]^[10]

Part V: Scientific Evidence of Quality Degradation

Rice Science: Fissuring, Storage, and Broken Rice

Extensive agricultural research confirms the mechanisms by which extended storage under suboptimal conditions inevitably produces high broken rice percentages:^[53]^[24]^[51]^[20]^[21]^[52]^[22]

Fissuring Mechanisms:

Rice kernels fracture during milling primarily due to internal fissuring that begins much earlier during drying and storage. Increased brokens result from:^[24]^[52]^[53]

· Rapid moisture absorption or loss

· Rapid or high-temperature drying

· Chalkiness and underdeveloped kernels

· Environmental factors: relative humidity changes, sudden temperature changes

· Insect infestation

· Excessive milling pressure on weakened kernels

Critical Research Findings:

1. Temperature Effects: Studies show paddy stored at ambient temperatures (28°C+) experiences accelerating quality degradation after 8 weeks, with grain yellowing and broken rice percentages increasing proportionally with storage time. Storage at 35°C causes germination rates to reach 0% after 180 days and fatty acid values to increase 2-fold compared to 15°C storage.^[26]^[22]

2. Humidity Effects: Research demonstrates that an increase in relative humidity of 20 percentage points or greater above moisture equilibrium conditions is sufficient to initiate fissures in rice kernels. Aeration with humid air remoisturizes grain, causing fissures in paddy.^[51]^[25]

3. Storage Duration: Studies tracking paddy quality over 6-24 months show that grain quality characters are "reduced with increasing storage periods from 6 to 12, 18 and 24 months." Head rice recovery at ambient temperature decreases over time regardless of moisture content, while broken rice percentages increase.^[27]^[29]^[22]

4. Modern Mills vs. Traditional: Modern rice mills typically generate 10-15% broken rice, while smaller, less-modern mills can generate as much as 30% brokens. Under extended storage conditions (12+ months) even modern mills will produce 30-40%+ brokens due to fissuring that occurs before milling.^[52]^[1]^[3]^[2]

5. Safe Storage Limits: Agricultural guidelines specify that paddy at 14% moisture content can be stored safely for 8-12 months at temperatures below 25°C. At 16% moisture, storage is safe for only 4 months. Beyond these limits, quality deterioration accelerates exponentially.^[19]^[20]^[18]^[21]^[22]

The Telangana Reality:

Millers in Telangana are being forced to store paddy for 12-17+ months (median 10-14 months) under uncontrolled ambient conditions with temperature ranges of 15-45°C and humidity swings of 40-90% during monsoon cycles. This is so far beyond safe storage parameters that the 25% broken rice limit is physically impossible to achieve.^[6]^[8]^[1]^[3]^[2]

The 10% vs. 25% Broken Rice Initiative

In 2024-25, the central government launched a pilot program to procure CMR with only 10% broken rice content (instead of the standard 25%) from select states including Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Haryana, and Chhattisgarh. The target is 5 million tonnes.^[16]^[59]

Under this model, millers deliver 85 quintals of higher-quality rice (10% broken) in one lot and 15 quintals of fully broken rice separately. The 15% broken rice is intended for ethanol production and animal feed, while the 10% broken rice is more marketable.^[59]^[16]

However, experts note this is "no major upgrade" since 25% broken rice has long been in trade and consumption. More critically, the initiative does not address the root cause of the Telangana crisis—extended forced storage. Even producing 10% broken rice requires milling paddy within 3-6 months of harvest under controlled conditions. Paddy stored for 12-17 months will produce 30-40%+ broken rice regardless of milling technology.^[22]^[16]^[52]^[1]^[3]^[2]

FCI itself struggles to sell the current 25% broken rice variety at auctions, as buyers prefer local market supplies at lower rates. The initiative appears designed for states with functional procurement cycles, not for systems experiencing the chronic storage crisis documented in Telangana.^[16]

Part VI: National Context and Comparative Analysis

FCI Storage and Procurement Nationwide

As of July 2025, India's central pool held 377.83 lakh metric tonnes of rice and 358.78 lakh metric tonnes of wheat—far exceeding stocking norms of 135.40 LMT rice and 275.80 LMT wheat. The surplus rice alone is approximately 242 LMT above buffer requirements.^[60]

FCI's national storage capacity as of July 2023 was 371.93 LMT across 1,923 warehouses (owned/hired). Telangana's allocation of 13.329 LMT owned capacity and approximately 9 LMT hired capacity represents roughly 6% of national FCI storage.^[55]

Decentralized Procurement (DCP) Model:

Fifteen states/UTs have adopted DCP mode for rice procurement, where the state government undertakes direct purchase, storage, and distribution under the National Food Security Act (NFSA), with excess stocks handed over to FCI. Telangana operates under this model.^[61]^[62]^[63]

Under DCP, the central government meets the entire expenditure incurred on procurement operations as per approved costing and provides advance subsidy. However, the system depends on timely evacuation of excess stocks by FCI—which has failed in Telangana's case due to national storage saturation.^[30]^[62]^[7]^[61]^[6]

CMR Defaults in Other States

The CMR default problem is not unique to Telangana, though the scale and severity appear particularly acute:^[64]^[65]^[37]^[40]^[32]

· West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha: These states have implemented bank guarantee systems (10-25% based on default history) as "collateral security" to safeguard against non-delivery of CMR.^[37]^[40]^[64]

· Haryana: In 2025-26, Haryana implemented a new CMR policy reducing broken rice limits from 25% to 10%, which sparked strong opposition from millers who argued it adds unreasonable burden. The policy requires staggered deliveries over 8 months with specific percentages due each month.^[13]^[12]

· Punjab: Punjab is part of the 10% broken rice pilot program and generally achieves higher out-turn ratios (70 kg per 100 kg paddy) due to different paddy varieties and soil conditions.^[50]

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) recommended bank guarantee mechanisms about a decade ago as a safeguard against CMR defaults. However, implementing these mechanisms in a crisis environment—where the system itself is causing defaults through forced extended storage—penalizes millers for government logistics failure rather than addressing root causes.^[40]^[64]

The National Food Security Act (NFSA) Context

The NFSA, enacted in 2013, mandates that approximately 67% of India's population receive subsidized foodgrains: 5 kg per person per month for priority households at Rs 3/kg, and 35 kg per family per month for Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) households.^[66]^[62]^[67]

To meet NFSA obligations, the central government must:^[62]^[60]^[66]

· Procure foodgrains for the central pool through FCI and state agencies

· Allocate foodgrains to states based on eligible population

· Transport foodgrains to designated depots in each state

· Create and maintain required modern and scientific storage facilities at various levels

· Provide assistance to state governments for intra-state movement, handling, and FPS dealer margins

The system is designed to maintain buffer stocks plus operational stocks for TPDS (Targeted Public Distribution System) and welfare schemes. However, when procurement exceeds both buffer requirements and PDS demand—as has occurred nationally—the system experiences what economists call "overstock deadlock." FCI godowns fill up, new deliveries cannot be accepted, and the backlog cascades onto mills.^[30]^[60]^[62]^[32]^[1]

Telangana's situation is exacerbated by the central government's 2021 decision to stop procuring parboiled rice from the state, citing four years' worth of existing stocks. This further limited offtake options and contributed to the crisis.^[30]

Part VII: Systemic Root Causes

The Asymmetric Dynamics: Allotment Without Offtake

The fundamental structural flaw is asymmetric system dynamics:^[1]

Allotment (paddy moving INTO mills) operates at full speed during procurement seasons, driven by:

· Political imperatives to support farmers through MSP procurement

· State targets to maximize procurement (80 LMT for Telangana Kharif 2025-26)

· Legal obligations to farmers who bring paddy to purchasing centers

Offtake (rice moving OUT of FCI godowns to consuming states) has stalled due to:

· FCI storage at 96% capacity nationally and in Telangana^[6]

· PDS demand being met by existing stocks

· Export markets weakening due to global competition^[4]^[10]

· Slow evacuation via railway rakes (Telangana requested 300/month, actual allocation unclear)^[7]^[6]

The government continues procuring new paddy with no available storage capacity, forcing this paddy into mills. Simultaneously, mills cannot deliver previously allotted paddy because FCI godowns are full. This creates the "rolling backlog"—new stock arriving while old stock remains stuck, with mills caught in the middle, unable to process or release inventory.^[7]^[6]^[1]

The Liability Inversion

A critical injustice in the current system is liability inversion—the party with the least control over the system dynamics bears 100% of the financial risk:^[3]^[1]^[2]

Party	Control	Liability
Central Government (FCI)	Controls national procurement targets, storage allocation, offtake timing, railway rake availability	Zero financial liability for delays
State Government	Controls state procurement targets, paddy allotment to mills	Zero financial liability for delays
Rice Millers	Control only milling operations; cannot control when paddy arrives, when FCI accepts deliveries, storage duration, or climatic conditions	100% financial liability for quality degradation, weight loss, penalties, interest charges

Millers are penalized for quality failures that are the direct, inevitable result of systemic delays beyond their control. The data proves conclusively that the longest-stored paddy produces the quality rejections. Yet the miller, not the system, is declared the "defaulter."^[1]^[2]^[3]

The Missing Appeal Mechanism

There is no appeal process available to millers to contest Quality Control rejections, even when degradation is demonstrably caused by forced extended storage. The rejection is final, the penalty is automatic, and there is no arbitration mechanism to assess causality.^[1]

Agricultural research provides clear quality degradation timelines and safe storage parameters. A fair system would establish:^[18]^[21]^[19]^[22]

1. Baseline quality testing at the time of paddy allotment

2. Storage duration tracking with official timestamps

3. Degradation tolerance: Waiver of penalties when storage exceeds 9-12 months beyond allotment

4. Storage compensation: Additional payments for forced storage beyond normal milling cycles

5. Appeal rights: Independent technical review of QC rejections with scientific assessment

None of these safeguards exist in the current system.^[9]^[32]^[1]

Part VIII: Impact on Rice Milling Industry Structure

Small and Medium Mills Bear Disproportionate Impact

India's rice milling industry is predominantly composed of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs). In Haryana, for example, approximately 96% of rice mills are in the small-scale sector, with only 4% in the medium-scale sector. Similar patterns exist across rice-growing states, including Telangana.^[68]^[69]^[70]

These small mills typically have:^[69]^[70]^[68]

· Processing capacity: 1-2 metric tonnes per hour

· Limited working capital

· Restricted access to bank credit

· Minimal storage infrastructure (often just 2-3 sheds)

· Family-owned operations employing 10-50 workers

The bank guarantee requirements (10-25% of paddy value) represent an existential threat to small mills:^[38]^[36]^[37]^[41]^[11]

For a small mill receiving an allotment of 5,000 quintals of paddy (worth approximately Rs 1.2 crore at MSP):

· 10% bank guarantee = Rs 12 lakh

· 20% bank guarantee = Rs 24 lakh

· 25% bank guarantee = Rs 30 lakh

Many small mills do not have access to this level of bank credit, effectively excluding them from CMR operations. The Raw Rice Millers Association president stated: "Millers in this situation are not in a position to give bank guarantees."^[43]^[41]^[11]

Large parboiled mills with higher capacities and better capitalization have complied more readily (667 mills), while raw rice mills—predominantly smaller operations—lag significantly (only 992 of approximately 2,800+ mills).^[43]

The Capital Investment Trap

New equipment mandates compound the financial pressure:^[41]^[11]^[42]

· Sortex machines (colour sorters): Rs 15-30 lakh investment, installation deadline December 31, 2024^[40]^[42]

· Blending machines (for fortified rice kernels): Rs 5-10 lakh investment^[41]

· Modernization requirements: Additional costs for automation, dust control, quality systems

These represent significant capital outlays for mills already facing:^[11]^[41]

· Delayed government payments (often 2-3 months lag)

· Accumulated losses from previous-season defaults

· Bank guarantee requirements tying up working capital

· Rising operational costs (electricity, labour, diesel)

The economic viability of small-scale raw rice milling in Telangana is under severe threat.^[43]^[5]^[10]^[4]

Part IX: Political and Governance Dimensions

The BRS to Congress Transition

The crisis spans two governments with sharply different approaches:^[71]^[33]^[72]^[39]^[32]^[9]

BRS Government (2014-2023):

· Massive procurement expansion: paddy production grew from 68.17 LMT (2014-15) to over 200 LMT by 2022-23^[56]

· Lax enforcement of CMR delivery deadlines and quality standards^[33]^[32]

· Allegations of collusion between district civil supplies officials, BRS leaders, and defaulting millers^[33]

· Accumulated Rs 56,000 crore debt in Civil Supplies Corporation, Rs 11,000 crore losses, Rs 3,000 crore annual interest burden^[32]^[33]

· 2,500 crore worth of paddy allegedly diverted to private markets by defaulting millers^[37]

Congress Government (2023-Present):

· Stringent enforcement: bank guarantees, Revenue Recovery Act, property attachment^[36]^[38]^[39]^[37]

· Increased procurement transparency and allocation based on milling capacity^[39]^[9]

· Record procurement claims: 60.61 LMT in Rabi 2024-25 vs 36.63 LMT in Rabi 2022-23^[72]^[71]

· Target of 80 LMT for Kharif 2025-26^[35]^[7]^[6]

· But: continuation of structural problems (storage crisis, rolling backlog, quality degradation cycle)^[7]^[6]^[43]

The Congress government has successfully reduced new defaults through enforcement but has not resolved the underlying systemic crisis. The rolling backlog continues, FCI storage remains saturated, and millers still face forced extended storage with quality compliance expectations unchanged.^[9]^[6]^[7]^[43]

The Allegations of "Rice Scam"

In September 2024, the Congress government signalled plans to expose a "rice scam" from the BRS era, pointing to:^[33]

· Most rice millers not delivering rice to government from 2021-2023

· District civil supplies officials colluding with millers

· Rice diverted for private profit with support from BRS leaders

· Old Nalgonda district (rice mill hub) not delivering at least 40% of CMR in last monsoon season

· Data on paddy stocks and rice collected from mills not matching official figures

However, the research and data presented in this report suggest a more nuanced reality: while some diversion and fraud undoubtedly occurred, the majority of "defaults" are not willful misconduct but inevitable consequences of systemic storage and offtake collapse. Millers held paddy for 12-17+ months because FCI would not accept deliveries, not because they chose to divert.^[32]^[6]^[2]^[3]^[1]

Treating this as purely a law enforcement problem rather than a systems failure problem risks perpetuating the crisis while bankrupting legitimate millers caught in an impossible situation.

Part X: Conclusions and Systemic Assessment

The Core Finding: A System Beyond Repair

The preponderance of evidence leads to an unavoidable conclusion: The Custom Milled Rice system in Telangana has experienced a fundamental operational collapse that cannot be resolved through enforcement, penalties, or marginal policy adjustments.

The crisis is characterized by:^[9]^[6]^[7]^[2]^[3]^[1]

1. Chronic Storage Duration: 12-17+ months (median 10-14 months) as the norm, not exception

2. Inevitable Quality Degradation: Scientifically documented and quantitatively proven in delivery data

3. Saturated Infrastructure: FCI storage at 96% capacity with continued 80 LMT procurement targets

4. Asymmetric Liability: Millers bearing 100% financial risk for system failures beyond their control

5. Escalating Defaults: Rs 35,000 crore accumulated since 2014-15, only 6% recovered

6. Economic Devastation: 20-30% export decline, 55-60% operations drop, small mills facing closure

The False Dichotomy: 67% vs. 25%

The problem is not the 67% yield mandate—millers can meet this requirement under normal operational conditions.^[50]^[11]^[1]

The problem is the 25% broken rice limit in a system that has collapsed operationally, forcing millers to store paddy for 12-17+ months in conditions that make quality compliance physically impossible.^[2]^[3]^[1]

No amount of technology upgrades (Sortex machines, blending equipment), capital investment, or miller compliance will solve this problem. The paddy is being stored so far beyond safe parameters that even the most modern milling equipment cannot prevent 30-40%+ broken rice.^[53]^[24]^[52]^[22]

The Compounding Crisis

Each element of the crisis compounds the others in a vicious cycle:^[5]^[6]^[3]^[4]^[2]^[1]

· Procurement continues → More paddy forced into already-full mills → Longer storage duration → More quality degradation → More QC rejections → More defaults → More enforcement → More bank guarantees required → More mills unable to participate → Fewer mills handling procurement → Even longer storage per mill → Worse quality degradation → Crisis deepens

The system is locked in a death spiral where each "solution" (bank guarantees, penalties, enforcement) exacerbates the underlying problem (insufficient processing and evacuation capacity relative to procurement volume).

What This Is NOT

This is not:^[3]^[2]^[1]

· Miller negligence or incompetence

· Primarily a fraud or diversion problem

· A technology or equipment issue

· Solvable through better miller compliance

· A problem that can be enforced away

What This IS

This is:^[6]^[7]^[2]^[3]^[1]

· A fundamental mismatch between procurement volumes and storage/offtake capacity

· A predictable outcome of operating a system beyond its design parameters

· A scientific inevitability when paddy is stored 12-17+ months under ambient conditions

· A systemic failure of infrastructure planning and coordination between state and central agencies

· An economic catastrophe for small and medium rice milling enterprises

The Smoking Gun

The data provides the smoking gun evidence: A Kharif 2021-22 consignment was rejected by Quality Control in March 2023—precisely 15 months after allotment.^[2]^[3]

This single data point encapsulates the entire crisis. Fifteen months of forced storage, under Telangana's harsh climate, in a system where FCI refused deliveries for over a year—and the miller is penalized for the inevitable quality failure.

This is not justice. This is liability inversion. This is a system transferring its own operational collapse onto the shoulders of those with the least power to resist.

Recommendations

While the original reports did not include formal recommendations, the comprehensive analysis suggests several urgent interventions are necessary:

Immediate (0-3 months):

1. Declare a CMR Quality Amnesty: Waive all quality-based penalties and rejections for deliveries from paddy stored beyond 9 months from allotment date.

2. Emergency FCI Evacuation: Implement the requested 300 railway rakes per month to evacuate 21 LMT from Telangana FCI godowns immediately.^[7]^[6]

3. Storage Duration Transparency: Mandate official timestamping of paddy arrival at mills and CMR delivery calls, creating an auditable trail of storage duration.

Short-term (3-12 months):

4. Adjust Out-Turn Requirements: Conduct state-wide test milling to establish realistic out-turn ratios for Telangana paddy varieties (likely 58-63 kg vs. 67 kg target).^[57]^[50]

5. Storage Compensation: Pay millers additional custodian charges for forced storage beyond 6 months from allotment.

6. Procurement Moratorium: Suspend new paddy allotments to mills holding stock older than 8 months until existing backlog is cleared.

Medium-term (1-3 years):

7. Infrastructure Expansion: Add 30-40 LMT FCI storage capacity in Telangana through PEG scheme, Central Sector Scheme, and silo construction.^[55]

8. DCP Reform: Renegotiate the Decentralized Procurement model to include mandatory FCI evacuation timelines and penalties for central government delays.

9. Broken Rice Market Development: Establish official procurement of 15-25% broken rice for ethanol, animal feed, and industrial uses at fair prices, removing quality penalty pressure.^[59]^[16]

Structural (3-5 years):

10. Procurement Volume Alignment: Align annual procurement targets with actual PDS demand plus buffer requirements, not unlimited MSP purchase guarantees.

11. Miller Protection Mechanisms: Establish independent technical arbitration for quality disputes, with scientific assessment of storage duration vs. quality degradation causality.

12. Storage-Linked Allotment: Allocate paddy to mills based on available shed storage capacity, not total milling capacity, preventing forced open-plinth storage.

Data Appendices

Sources and Methodology

This comprehensive report synthesizes evidence from:

· Primary Data: Three anonymized rice mill reports covering CMR delivery logs from Kharif 2021-22, 2022-23, and 2023-24 seasons^[3]^[1]^[2]

· Government Sources: Press Information Bureau releases, state government orders, FCI data, DFPD notifications^[15]^[60]^[66]^[30]^[55]^[6]^[42]

· News Reports: 60+ articles from Telangana Today, Deccan Chronicle, Times of India, The Hans India, New Indian Express, and other publications covering the crisis from 2021-2025^[46]^[71]^[31]^[36]^[39]^[45]^[37]^[33]^[32]^[9]^[4]^[5]

· Scientific Literature: Peer-reviewed agricultural research on rice storage, quality degradation, fissuring mechanisms, and broken rice formation from ScienceDirect, NCBI, IRRI Knowledge Bank, and other sources^[20]^[21]^[24]^[51]^[26]^[28]^[18]^[52]^[22]^[53]

· Industry Sources: Rice miller association statements, civil supplies department data, CAG reports^[14]^[57]^[45]^[50]^[9]^[11]^[41]

The analysis represents a convergence of multiple independent evidence streams—miller data, government statistics, news reporting, and scientific research—all pointing to the same conclusion: systemic operational collapse with catastrophic consequences for Telangana's rice milling industry.

⁂

1. raw-ricemill-report-cmr.pdf

2. raw-ricemill-report3-cmr.pdf

3. raw-ricemill-report2-cmr.pdf

4. https://telanganatoday.com/telangana-rice-exports-nosedive-as-high-costs-global-competition-squeeze-market-share

5. https://iref.net/news/telangana-rice-exports-decline-amid-high-procurement-costs/

6. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/telangana-hopes-for-bumper-kharif-paddy-yield-faces-storage-crisis/articleshow/124311488.cms

7. https://www.deccanchronicle.com/southern-states/telangana/telangana-readies-storage-for-record-paddy-harvest-1910715

8. https://telanganatoday.com/telangana-faces-warehouse-crunch-as-kharif-harvest-nears-record

9. https://www.deccanchronicle.com/southern-states/telangana/recovering-cmr-from-defaulting-millers-remains-a-big-challenge-1909290

10. https://www.millingandmillers.com/2025/08/11/telangana-rice-exports-nosedive-as-high-costs-global-competition-squeeze-market-share/

11. https://ssricenews.com/rice-news/featured-news/telangana-wants-security-deposits-from-rice-millers.html